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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the

STATE OF UTAH
STATE O·F UTAH,
Responden.f,

KENNETH JOE BARKER,
Ap~pellant.

RESPONDENT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF CASE
The appellant was convicted of the crime of carnal
knowledge before the Sixth Judicial District Court of
the State of U~tah, in and for Garfield County, and it is
from this conviction that he appeals.

STATEJ\fENT OF FACTS
Appellant's brief contains a detailed summary of
the proceedings and evidence presented to the court and
jury upon which the conviction was based and it i.s felt
that a recapitulation of the factR at this ti1ne would serve
1
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no useful purpose to this Honorable Court. Where necessary, however' reference will be made to the testimony
in the transcript which respondent feels may aid this
Honorable Court in properly interpreting the facts in
accordanc-e with its theory of the case. The Assignments
of l~rror and Arguments in support thereof will be
answered in the order presented by the appellant.
ASSERTION NO. I
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN ADMITTING TESTIMONY ELICITED FROM THE MOTHER OF THE PROSECUTRIX.

ASSERTION NO. 2
THE COURT DID NOT ERR IN DENYING DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR A NEW TRIAL.

The only claim of appellant, in his two a;ssign1nents
of error, is that the court committed prejudicial error
to the substantial rights of the accused, in admitting
over objection by counsel for the accused, the testimony
of 1\{rs. Marsha Cope, mother of the prosecutrix, whose
testimony appellant contends was purely hearsay and
not admissible as part of the "res gestae." ·It is the
contention of the respondent on the other hand that the
disputed testimony of Mr.s. Cope was properly admitted
under any one of several exceptions to the ''hearsay''
rule, or that in any event, if her testi1nony was erroneously ad1nitted, it was harmless error and certainly did
not adversely affect the rights of ~the accused.
This Honorable Court has on numerous and repeated
occasions reiterated the unanimous holding of the court~
2
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that in rnpe cases the testimony of the prosecuting \vitness, or that of other \Yitnesses, is admissible for the purpose of sho,ving that the prosecutrix made complaint
of the outrage soon after its commission. See St·ate v.
Ha1ford, 18 Utah 3, 5+ Pac. 819, State v. Neel, 21 Utah
131, 60 Pac. 310; Sta.te v. Inzlay, 22 Utah 156, 61 Pac.
557; Sta.te v. Christensen, 73 Utah 575, 276 Pac. 163;
State v. Roberts, 91 Utah 117, 63 P. (2d) 584, State v.
Tellay, 100 Utah 25, 110 P. (2d) 342. Although there is
not unanimity among the courts, it is generally held in
this connection that the details and circums'tances of the
complaints or declarations of the p~rosecutrix are not
usually admissible in evidence unless they are part of
the ''res gestae,'' but the testimony is limited to ~the fact
that such complaints or declarations were made. Wharton's ''Criminal Evidence'' Vol. 1 Sec. 521; Wigmore on
Evidence, Third Edition Vol. 14, Sec. 1135 and see the
Utah cases cited supra.
Recognizing the above rules, respondent respectfully
aubmits that Mrs. Cope's testimony in effect revealed
nothing more than that her daughter at a certain time
and place and under cer'iain circumstances made conlplaint that an outrage had been committed upon her. It is
felt that this testimony was no more than was reasonably
necessary to show the time and place where the cornplaint was made, the circumstances under which it was
made, the person to 'vhom made, and the conduct of the
prosecutrix at the time .she made complaint and tha't
she exhibited physical indications that an outrage had
been committed upon her as ronfirmatory of her testi ..
3
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mony, which evidence
Sec. 49, page 1214.

IS

always admissible. 22 R.C.L.

A sin1ilar line of testimony was elicited by the di~
trict attorney in the case of State v. Roberts, 91 1Ttah
117, 63 P. (2d) 584, when the witness was asked:

"Q.

What did she say with reference to that
and what had happened~

A.

Why she says 1\fr. Roberts had taken her out
on the highway some place and ...

~[r.

Larson: I want to object to that question for
~the reason it is hearsay, no part of the res
gestae, a statement made out of the presence
of the defendant at a time when he wasn't
present, a considerable length of time after
the alleged occurrence.''
The objection "\Vas overruled. The witness
thereupon an,vered:
''She said he had taken her out on the highway
and forced intercourse. She says: 'I am almost ripped to pieces.' "
In affirming the judgment of conviction this court held
in the course of its opinion:
''Aside from her having named the defendant, the statement of the prosecutrix in the ins·tant case did not attempt to describe details. It
sin1ply tended to show that the act of intercourse
had been consummated by force and violence. A
case somewhat similar is People v. Rotello, :i39
Ill. 448, 171 N.E. 540. We think that under the
authority of these cases no reversible error was
con1mitted in receiving this tesltimony.''
Even assuming, for purpose of argument, tha't the
4
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district attorney n1ay haY<> probed further into the
details and particulars in the instant case than ordinarily
w·ould be condoned by the authorities, it is respectfully
subn1itted that this testin1ony \vas properly admitted
under either one of t\vo other theories as exceptions
to the hearsay rule. Counsel for appellant concedes that
the spontaneous declarations of a prosecutrix are adnlissible as part of the "res gestae" but argues that in
this instance they did not con1e within that exception
because they '""ere made calmly and deliberately in a
long dra\vn-out narrative form after she had had ample
time for deliberation and reflection. It is the contention
of respondent that these declarations were properly adnlitted as part of the "res gestae." The transcript will
definitely show that only thirty minutes elapsed from
the time the prosecutrix left the scene of the . offense
until she, in a .serni-hysterical state, still suffering fron1
the humiliation and emotional upset of the outrage which
had been committed upon her, made the declarations to
her mother ( Tr. p. 36-37).
In discussing the remoteness of time from a particular event as to when the declarations of a party may
be considered part of ~the ''res gestae,'' it is said in
.J one.s ''Commentaries on Evidence,'' Second Edition,
~rr. 1204 at page 2210:
·'It is impractical to fix, by general rule, any
instant of time at which it may be said to be too
late for an act or declaration to l )e part of the re.s
gestae and so as ~to preclude debate and conflict
of opinion in regard to this particular point. So
long, ho"rpyer, aR suspieion of fabrication is ab5
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sent, and no taint of preconceived action or suggestion of design is present the fact that there
is a slight interval between the declaration and
the principal transaction, and that they are not
entirely synchronous, does not affect its adnli~s
ibility as part of the res gestae."
There are numerous cases cited in 2 A.L.R. 1525 as
~upplemented in 157 A.L.R. 1359 where the admission of
~nch co1npaints, statements or declarations made several
minutes after~ and even as much as an hour and a half
after the offense was committed was held not to he error.
It would appear that under the circumstances of this
0ase the s~t.atements and declarations were properly admitted because there could certainly be no ''suspicion
of fabrication'' or ''taint of preconceived action or suggestion of design.'' To deny the admissibility of the
statements and declarations in this case would in effect
be an attempt to "exclude everything from the res
gestae which did not occur on the very instant of the
grinding of the flesh and bones'' to borrow a phrase
quoted in Peirce v. ~am Duren, 78 Fed. 707, 24 C.C.A.
280; 69 L.R.A. 705.
It is respectfully submitted likewise that the disputed testimony of Mrs. Cope, even if not considered
part of the ''res gestae,'' \vas properly ad1ni ttec1 under
the principle, generally accepted by the authorities, that
such evidence may be received \Vhenever the details or
particulars are inquired into on cross-examination or
whenever an atitempt is made to impeach the credibility
of the testimony of the prosecutrix. As said in State v.
Orlando, 119 N.J.L. 175, 194 Atl. 879, in \vhirh the rourt
6
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adn1itted thr testilnony of a physician who examined
the prosecutrix \Yithin an hour or t\YO after the alleged
attack concerning the details of her complaint against
defendant:
~~

' T e think that the testimony was properly

admitted for the purpose of rehabilitating the
credibility of the prosecutrix in the circumstances
of the case.

*

*

*

:11:

"Now it is widely held in rape cases thBJt
evidence of the details of the complaint of the
prosecutrix as made to another is admissible for
the purpose of 'rehabiliting the credibility' of the
prosecutrix after, as here, she has testified as a
witness and has been impeached and the credibility of her testimony has been attacked on.
cross-examination. 2 Wigmore on Evidence (2d
Ed.) Sec 1138, Sec 1760; 22 R.C.L. 1215, par. 48,
n.i. ; 3 Greenleaf on Evidence (16th Ed.) Sec. 213;
Underhill Crim. Evidence (4th Ed.) Sec. 668, and
cases cited there.''
Furthermore, see the striking statement of the cour1t
In Griffin r. State, 76 ~· 29, wherein it was· held:
'• ''Then the complaint constitutes no part of the
res gestae, and is received only as corroborative
of her testimony, neither the particulars detailed
by her, nor the name of the person whom she
mentioned as the offender, can be given in evidence in the first instance. But the defendant
n1ay, on c.ross-examinati.on, inquire into the p~ar
ticnlars of the comp~lari.nt, and thus m~ak.e ·admissible el'idPnce rela.ting thereto by both parttes; or,
if the defendant introrl?tres e1'idrnce to impeach
the prosrrutri.r, the prosrru.tri.r 1nay S1,f.stain her
7
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

by showing that her sta.tements in mak·ing the
compla.itnt, and her testi.mony on the trial, correspond. Scott v. State, 48 Ala. 420; Nichols v.
Stew;art, 20 Ala, 358; Tho1npson v. State. 38 Ind.
39; B~accio v. People, 41 N.Y. 265; 3 Greenl, on EL'.
sec. 213; 2 Birch. Crim. Proc. see. 963.
It is finally the contention of the respondent that
even if the ~trial court improperly admitted the disputed
testimony of Mrs. Cope, it was harmless error and did
not adversely affect the substantial rights of the accused.
The rule is too well recognized to need citation of authority that an error commit~ted in the court below ·will
not 'varrant a reversal of the judgment of conviction
unless it has in some way prejudiced the substantial
rights of the accused. In the present case, it will be seen
that the very testimony concerning which appellant
complains was gone into in minute detail in the cross
examination of the prosecutrix. (Trancript pages 21-24)
It seems rather improbable that the teBtimony of Mrs.
Cope, concerning the declaration made to her by lthe
prosecutrix, could have prejudicially influenced or
swayed the jury in view of the type of testimony which
was so colorfully portrayed for them in the cross examination of the prosecutrix by counsel for appellant.
CONCLU:SION
It is respectfully submitted that ~the testimony of Mrs.
Cope was properly admitted in evidence under any one
of the theories propounded above and that even if it
should be determined by this Honorable Court that the
trial court erroneously admitted this testimony, that it

8
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'vas harn1less error and did not prejudice the rights of
the accused so as to "Tarrant a reversal of the judgment.
It is submitted that the eveidence in the record established justific~tion for the unprejudiced verdict of the
jury rendered below, and that it should therefor be af..
firmed by thi.s Honorable Court.
Respectfully submitted,

CLINTON D. \TERNON
Attorney General
QUENTIN L. R. ALSTON.
Assistant Attorney General
Attorn-eys for Respondent
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